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Abstract 
JAN AHLEN: The “EU Effect” and the Export of Environmental Standards to 
the U.S. 
(Under the direction of Dr. Gary Marks) 
 
In the past twenty years, decisions on global environmental regulations have increasingly 
originated in Brussels instead of Washington. Many European Union (EU) environmental 
laws are having effects well beyond the borders of the EU. This thesis examines three EU 
environmental policies to determine the extent to which they are having an “EU Effect” in 
the United States (U.S.).  The impact is measured at the market, state, and federal levels.  The 
thesis also explores the role that economic context, regulatory learning, and political context 
have had on the diffusion of these three policies. The three policies examined include two 
directives, RoHS (Restriction of Hazardous Substances) and WEEE (Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment), and one regulation, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and 
Authorization of Chemicals).  Each of these environmental policies is impacting the U.S. at 
the market, state, and federal levels, albeit to varying degrees.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
At the academic level, there is a substantial amount of literature on the 
phenomenon of the “California Effect”. This refers to “the critical role of powerful and 
wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions in promoting a regulatory ‘race to the top’ among 
their trading partners”.1 The name comes from the phenomenon of California, which 
traditionally imposes stronger environmental standards than the federal government and 
the rest of the states. To be able to sell its products to the vast California market, 
companies have had to comply with its regulations, leading other states and the federal 
government to pass regulations in line with California’s in order for companies to remain 
competitive. 
 In the past twenty years, decisions on global regulation are been increasingly 
being made in Brussels as opposed to Washington. Many European Union (EU) 
environmental laws are having effects beyond the borders of the EU. Recently, the EU 
has enacted three pieces of legislation with a potential to lead to a California Effect 
outside the EU. These include two directives, RoHS (Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances)2 and WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment)3, and one 
                                                            
1 Vogel, David. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995. P. 6. 
2 EU Directive on Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Electrical & Electronic Equipment/RoHS. 
http://www.icer.org.uk/RoHS20030127.pdf  
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regulation, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals). All three 
pieces of legislation regulate product standards, requiring producers to comply in order to 
be able to sell the product in the EU market. Product standards, such as a labeling 
requirement on baby food, regulate the way in which products are treated. This is 
opposed to process standards, such as CO2 emissions from an industrial plant. Research 
shows that product standards are more exportable to other jurisdictions than process 
standards.4 Limiting this research to regulations governing product standards controls for 
the effect of type of standard.  
The RoHS directive was passed in 2003 and was implemented in EU member 
states beginning in 2006.5 It restricts the use of six hazardous substances in the 
production of electronic devices. They include lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent 
chromium, polybrominated biphenyls (PBE) and polybrominated biphenyl ether (PBDE). 
The directive applies to the following categories of electronics: IT and 
telecommunications equipment; electronic and electrical tools; monitoring and control 
instruments; toys, leisure and sports equipment6. These categories are broad and affect a 
large portion of U.S. electronic industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 EU Directive on Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment/WEEE. 
http://www.icer.org.uk/WEEE20030127.pdf  
4 Sachs, Noah M. “Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation”. 
Forthcoming, Vanderbilt Law Review. P. 38-39. 
 
5 Schneiderman, Ron. “Regulatory Compliance Means Going the Extra Green Mile. Electronic Design. 29 
Jan 2009. 
 
6 “Understanding the Requirements of the European RoHS Directive and its Impact on Your Business”. 
MEC  
Inovation. http://www.meccompanies.com/leadfree/understanding_ROHS.pdf  
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The WEEE directive “provides for the creation of collection schemes where 
consumers return their used E-Waste free of charge. The objective of these schemes is to 
increase the recycling and/or re-use of such products”7. In addition to the categories of 
electronic and electrical equipment that RoHS covers, WEEE covers medical devices and 
monitors as well as control instruments.8 WEEE therefore affects a broader range of 
producers than RoHS. Producers of these types of electric and electronic equipment are 
obligated to recycle their E-Waste.9 
REACH is an EU regulation that does exactly what its acronym stands for: it 
registers, evaluates and authorizes chemicals that may be harmful or dangerous. REACH 
places the burden of proof of the safety of chemicals on the producers, in line with the 
“no data, no market” approach.10 REACH is intrusive because it covers about 40,000 
chemicals and affects many downstream users because of the large number of substances 
covered. 
                                                            
 
7 Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment. European Commission. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/waste_management/l21210_en.htm  
 
8 Interview with Chris Sherwood at the US Foreign Commercial Service to the EU. 
9 Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment. European Commission. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/waste_management/l21210_en.htm  
10 Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH), European Chemicals Agency. 
European Commission. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_goods/chemical_products/l2128
2_en.htm  
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1.2 Research Question 
In this thesis I compare and contrast RoHS, WEEE and REACH and the extent to 
which there has been a California Effect. Scholars such as David Volk have identified the 
different conditions which make the California Effect more likely. However, there has 
not been a treatment of these three EU laws from a comparative perspective.  
This thesis examines the findings of prior research on the California Effect and 
extends them to the EU-US trade relationship. I explore the impact that RoHS, WEEE 
and REACH are having in the U.S., at both the legislative and market level.  
This research addresses three research questions. To what extent have these laws 
had a tangible impact at the market, state, and federal level in the U.S.? What factors 
have contributed to this impact? Given the fact that each of these pieces of legislation is 
relatively new, to what extent can we expect each of these laws to be adopted in the U.S.? 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
In the next section, I outline the theory of the California Effect and present my 
working hypotheses about the likelihood that EU environmental policies will be exported 
to the U.S. and the factors that affect this diffusion. This is followed in Section 3 by a 
description of the methods used and how the variables are operationalized. In Section 4, I 
present the cases of RoHS, WEEE and REACH and their effects on the U.S. federal, 
state, and market level policies. In Section 5, I reflect back on the theories and 
expectations in relation to the findings from the case studies. Finally, in Section 6 I 
conclude by summarizing the paper and suggesting areas of further study. 
 
  
2 Theory 
Previous research suggests three factors can influence the success of exporting 
environmental policies: economic context, regulatory learning, and political context. The 
evidence for their role in the diffusion of environmental policies is explained in this 
section.  
2.1 Economic Context 
Two different variables constitute economic context: the dependence on the EU 
market and the burdens on industry of complying with the policy. 
The first variable that I consider is dependence on the EU market. If an 
environmental policy pertains to a product standard, any company that wishes to export 
to the EU market must abide by the same policy. The EU is an enormous market with a 
substantial customer base (495 million inhabitants/ 12276.2 euro Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)) bigger than the U.S.1 Within the EU market itself, there is evidence of the 
California Effect which is based on the power of Germany. Because of the size of the 
German GDP and population, German environmental policies have been diffused to the 
rest of the EU.2 Based on this previous research, my hypothesis is that a U.S. jurisdiction 
with a high dependence on the EU market is more likely to adopt these three policies. 
These jurisdictions include the market, state government, and federal government.   
                                                            
1 “Key Facts and Figures about Europe and the Europeans”. Europa. 
http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm  
 
2 Vogel, p. 264 
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The financial burden a policy imposes on industry means how much it would cost 
a specific industry to comply with the EU policy. The effect of the cost to comply may be 
dampened if the industry is highly globalized like industries covered by RoHS, WEEE 
and REACH.  Even if compliance is burdensome to an industry, firms are likely to adopt 
the highest regulatory standard if the industry is highly globalized. Because parts are 
made in different areas of the world with varying regulatory systems, it will be more 
efficient for a company to make one product for all markets rather than producing 
separate products for different markets.  Because EU standards are more stringent than 
others, if a company adopts the EU standard then it will use that standard for all of its 
markets.  Furthermore, companies are likely to choose the highest standard so that they 
can continue operating in that jurisdiction. This is especially the case for industries that 
are well established in both the U.S. and EU such as the chemical and electronics 
industries.3 
Based on these two variables, my hypothesis is that U.S. jurisdictions will adopt 
an EU-like policy if the cost of implementing that single new policy does not outweigh 
the benefit of exporting to the EU market.  Also, the greater the share of EU exports, the 
lower the relative cost of extending EU regulations to the US.  
2.2 Regulatory Learning 
Regulatory learning is when members of a jurisdiction learn from the experience 
of another jurisdiction, leading to policy diffusion. Two different variables can lead to the 
                                                            
 
3 Selin, Henrik and Stacy D. VanDeveer. “Raising Global Standards: Hazardous Substances and E-Waste 
Management in the European Union”. Environment. Vol. 48, N 10, p. 6-17. Dec 2006.  
www.heldref.org/env.php  
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process of regulatory learning: the availability of data and channels of communication.4 
According to Biedenkopf (2009), “the availability and accessibility of information about 
a pioneer policy and the interaction between political entities are key prerequisites for 
learning.”5  
2.2.1 Availability of Data 
David Lazer points out that countries provide signals to each other constantly by 
providing scientific background research about why they adopted a certain policy and by 
providing information about the impacts of the policy.6 Sachs points out the importance 
of raw data which can have direct effects on the regulatory decision of other jurisdictions. 
Availability of data can include databases or impact assessment reports that national and 
state regulators can learn from. My hypothesis is that if a policy involving tougher 
standards is accompanied by a substantial amount of data that is accessible to U.S. 
jurisdictions, it is more likely that tougher standards will be adopted by those U.S. 
jurisdictions as a result of regulatory learning. 
2.2.2 Channels of Communication 
In order to gain access to and be influenced by these data, law-makers, regulators, 
and industry leaders must have an arena where learning can occur. In recent years, the 
                                                            
 
4 Biedenkopf, Katja. “Policy Diffusion and Environmental Pioneership: Insights for Transatlantic 
Cooperation Fostering Biodiversity and Biosafety?”. Handling Global Challenges: Managing 
Biodiversity/Biosafety in a Global World. EE, US, California And Comparative Perspectives. Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies. 2009 
 
5 Biedenkopf, Katja.  
 
6 Lazer, David. Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in Regulatory Policymaking, 
12 European Law Journal 455 (2006).  
 
 
  8
U.S. and EU have taken steps to institutionalize their economic relationship and work 
towards regulatory cooperation. The transgovernmental dialogue has produced a series of 
joint agreements including the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, the New Transatlantic 
Agenda, and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. Transnational dialogues have been 
set up including the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialogue (TACD), and the Transatlantic Policy Network (TAPN). The Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations (UN) and issue 
specific non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a big role in disseminating 
information and impacting regulatory decisions.  
Vogel (1997) asserts that “trade and trade agreements represent transmission belts 
by which producers, and environmental and consumer groups, can influence the 
regulatory policies of their trading partners, and in turn be influenced by them”7 Further, 
Holzinger, Joergens and Knill argue that “transnational communication, interaction and 
exchange of information can lead to learning, symbolic emulation, norm-based 
activities”.8  
Not all regulatory cooperation is between the U.S. federal government and the 
EU.  Helge Joergens shows how California and the EU engage regulatory cooperation as 
evidenced by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s meetings with European leaders. For 
example, on July 31, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed a climate change and clean 
energy agreement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair.9 
                                                            
7 Vogel, p. 3 
 
8 Biedenkopf, Katja.   
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2.3 Political Context 
Political context includes the strength and involvement of interest groups, the 
political party in power, regulatory culture and, for the federal government, how many 
states have already passed similar laws.10 
2.3.1 Regulatory Culture 
I refer to regulatory culture as how a jurisdiction perceives risk. While the EU 
adheres to a regulatory culture of precaution, the U.S. adheres to a more scientific-proof 
based risk approach. The Precautionary Principle (PP) is a contentious issue in 
transatlantic regulatory policy. As the name suggests, it is based on precaution and it 
states that policies should take action against possible risks, even without definite 
scientific proof that it poses risks. The EU first incorporated the PP into EU law with the 
1993 Maastricht Treaty and uses it as the basis for its environmental laws. The U.S. 
government, in contrast, does not officially endorse the principle; it relies instead on 
direct scientific evidence. Differences in guiding principles have in the past led to 
transatlantic regulatory battles such as the one over Genetically Modified Organisms. 
This suggests that it will be more difficult for jurisdictions that do not adhere to the PP to 
adopt EU-inspired environmental policies.  
2.3.2 Political Party in Power 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 Joergens, Helge. 2004. Governance by diffusion: implementing global norms through cross-national 
imitation and learning. In Lafferty, William M. (ed.). Governance for Sustainable Development. The 
Challenge of Adapting Form to Function: 246-83. 
 
10 Joergens, Helge 
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Another variable to consider is the policy of the governing political party. 
Generally in the U.S., the Democratic Party is more environmentally friendly than the 
Republican Party. The U.S. has not passed a major piece of environmental legislation 
since 1990 and this has coincided with Republican dominance in Congress. However, the 
situation is now different at the federal level. The newly elected Democratic President has 
promised environmentally friendly legislation and the Democratic Party controls the 
House and Senate.  Thus, the California Effect is more likely when the Democratic Party 
is in power. 
2.3.3 Interest Groups 
A third variable is the presence of strong interest groups advocating for adoption 
of the policy. Interest groups can include environmental NGOs as well as industry 
groups. In the past, the California Effect has occurred when alliances between producers 
and environmental and consumer organizations have advocated stricter environmental 
policies in their own interest. Producers already have to comply with the rules of the 
export market. Thus, these producers have an incentive to raise standards because of their 
dependency on the export market and because it is cheaper for exporters to produce one 
version for both markets they sell to. Also, multinational firms that export to the EU will 
lobby for EU-like policies because otherwise they are at a competitive disadvantage to 
smaller firms who only produce for the U.S. market.11 
NGOs have used the EU example in their role as transmitters of information. 
Henrik Selin points out, for example, that NGO advocates “might ask why, if certain 
                                                            
11 Edith Brown Weiss, “Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,” Yale Law Journal, 
102 (1993): 2135. 
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substances are deemed too risky for use in Europe, are they still being used in the United 
States?”12  
2.3.4 Existing Legislation at the State Level 
Ironically, the California Effect itself determines whether EU environmental 
policies will be adopted at the federal level. California is a pioneer state in terms of its 
environmental policies. California environmental standards are then frequently adopted at 
the national level so that businesses do not have to comply with more than one standard. 
Because California often gets inspiration from the EU, it follows that if California adopts 
an EU policy, it will be more likely that the same policy will be adopted at the federal 
level.13 Finally, if there are more states that adopt an EU policy, there is a higher chance 
that the policy will be adopted at the national level.14  
 
                                                            
 
12 Selin, Henrik and Stacy D. VanDeveer. ”Raising Global Standards: Hazardous Substances and E-Waste 
Management in the European Union. Environment. Volume 48. No. 10. Dec. 2006.  
 
13 David Vogel 
 
14 Ditz, Daryl W. “The States and the World: Twin Levers for Reform of U.S. Federal Law on Toxic 
Chemicals”. Sustainable Development Law & Policy. 2007.  
  
3 Methodology 
This section describes the approach I took explaining each of the factors described 
above. The dependent variable for this research is the level of adoption of EU policy at 
the market, state, and federal level. I consider the change as a result of RoHS, WEEE, 
and REACH. Change at the market level is measured by whether the industry affected by 
the specific EU environmental policy has complied with the policy. Change at the state 
and federal level is measured by the existence of reform in the policy area governed by 
the specific EU environmental policy. The data come from peer-reviewed academic 
literature, government websites, and websites of trade associations. 
Three broad factors serve as explanatory factors for this thesis. The economic 
context includes: 1) the percentage of a jurisdiction’s exports to the EU that are affected 
by EU environmental policies, and 2) the financial burden for companies of complying 
with EU rules. The bulk of the data on these two issues comes from secondary sources 
such as peer-reviewed academic literature. In some cases, this information is 
supplemented by data posted on the websites of state governments and trade associations. 
The second factor, regulatory learning, is defined as the transfer of knowledge and 
experience through channels of communication from the EU to the U.S. Regulatory 
learning is reflected by 1) the availability of data produced by an EU law and 2) the 
quality of transatlantic communication about this policy (e.g. through such structures as 
the TABD and the OECD). Information on these issues comes from secondary sources. 
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The third factor is the political context in which decisions for proposed policies take 
place. This includes 1) the level of interest group involvement in the regulatory issue, 2) 
the policy position of the political party in power, 3) the regulatory traditions of the 
government, and 4), in the case of the U.S. federal government, the number of states that 
have already adopted the law. Information comes from secondary sources, including 
peer-reviewed academic literature and, when available, policy statements and other 
information interest groups post on their websites. 
  
4 Results 
In this section I present case studies of the three EU environmental policies. In 
each case study I describe the degree of diffusion to U.S. jurisdictions and consider the 
impacts of economic context, regulatory learning and political context on this policy 
diffusion. 
4.1 The EU’s Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive 
RoHS is an example of an EU policy that has impacted the U.S. electronic 
industry in a major way. In this section I first discuss the impact on the US marketplace, 
then describe its impact on one state’s policy (California) and on U.S. federal policy. I 
demonstrate that RoHS has had a substantial impact on the marketplace and on the 
environmental policy of the state of California. California is the only state that has 
adopted RoHS-type legislation and at the federal level, RoHS legislation is far from 
certain. However, there is a movement in other states as well as at the federal level for 
adopting RoHS-type legislation.  
4.1.1 RoHS’ Impact on the Marketplace 
RoHS is invasive in the U.S. marketplace because it governs how a product is 
produced. If a substance is restricted under RoHS, then the company must find a 
substitute in order to produce their product. The electronics industry is highly globalized 
and different stages of production are performed in different countries with different 
regulations. Within the marketplace, “the RoHS Directive is leading to major changes in 
  15
electronics manufacturing in the United States…as manufacturers seek substitutes for the 
substances banned under the Directive”1 Because of the globalized supply chain, 
INFORM, an environmental NGO, argues that in reality, the major electronics 
manufacturers are creating one standard product applicable in all markets in order to 
maximize efficiency.2 Panasonic, for example, converted all of their products to exclude 
lead by 2003. 
INFORM argues that the size of the EU market has driven the electronics industry 
to essentially adopt the RoHS directive. With the addition of Romania and Bulgaria, the 
EU now has a larger population and larger GDP than the U.S., making it essential for the 
electronics industry to comply with RoHS in order to maintain market share.3 
In sum, RoHS has caused major changes in the U.S. electric and electronic 
industries. These changes in the marketplace appear to be the result of the economic 
context. Not surprisingly, there appears to be no evidence that political context or 
regulatory learning have played a role in the diffusion to the marketplace.  
4.1.2 RoHS’ Impact on U.S. State Policy 
California is the only state to have enacted reforms close to that of the EU RoHS 
Directive. In 2003, California passed SB 20/SB 50, the Electronic Waste Recycling Act 
of 2003 (EWRA). This law has been dubbed “Cal RoHS”. It is important to note that 
                                                            
1 Sachs,Noah. “Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the European Union 
and the United States”. P. 85. 
 
2 INFORM, p. 2 
 
3 Inform p. 2 
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there is a provision in the law that stipulates that if the EU adds a new substance to 
RoHS, EWRA will automatically be updated to include this substance.4 This is a 
testament to the amount of influence the EU has in promoting its environmental policies 
in California.  
Economic Context 
California’s electronics sector is highly dependent on the EU market. According 
to the California Chamber of Commerce, California is the number one exporter in the 
nation of computers and electronic products. Computers and electronic products are 
California's top export, accounting for 42 percent of all the state's exports”. Further, the 
electronics industry is California’s leading exporter to the EU.5 This dependence on the 
EU market has been a major reason for the adoption of new legislation aligned with EU 
policies.6  
Regulatory Learning 
California and the EU engage in regulatory cooperation which can lead to 
learning. For example, EU Ambassador to the U.S., John Bruton signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, which 
promised cooperation in regulatory affairs regarding green chemistry and waste 
management. The “Green Chemistry Report”, commissioned in 2004 by the California 
Senate Environmental Quality Committee and the California Assembly Committee on 
                                                            
4 JCOTS 
 
5 ”Trade Statistics”. California Chamber of Commerce. www.calchamber.com  
 
6 Selin, p. 15, See also: Scoll, Jonathan P and Julie M. Duckstad. “Cal RoHS: California Brings European 
Hazardous Content Regulation ‘Home’ to U.S. Manufactures”. Lindquist&Vennum PLLP. May. 2008. 
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Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials, specifically references EU RoHS as a good 
model for California. Furthermore, there is evidence that California had direct contact 
with the EU Commission before implementing “Cal RoHS”. This ultimately helped lead 
to California’s ambitious EWRA legislation.7 
Political Context 
California accepts a more precautionary approach closer to the EU, which made it 
possible to adopt Calf RoHS. California is considered to be a unique case and Cal RoHS-
type legislation is not expected to be replicated in the rest of the U.S. Chris Sherwood of 
the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service in Brussels believes that other U.S. states have not 
emulated California because of the regulatory culture in the U.S. In contrast to the 
precautionary measures taken in the EU and California, the rest of the U.S. has preferred 
to pass legislation based on direct evidence of harm to health and the environment.  
4.1.3 RoHS’ Impact on U.S. Federal Policy  
At the U.S. federal level, a RoHS-like policy has been introduced in Congress. 
The Environmental Design of Electrical Equipment (EDEE) Act, or HR 2420, was 
proposed by U.S. Congressman Burgess and aims to harmonize the current U.S. 
hazardous substances rules into one policy. EDEE was introduced on May 14, 2009. It 
has so far only been referred to Committee and no vote has taken place. 
Economic Context 
                                                            
 
7 Interview with Chris Sherwood at the US Foreign Commercial Service to the EU. 
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The U.S. computer and electronics industry is highly dependent on the EU market 
and is crucial to the U.S. economy. According to the TABD, it is the U.S.’s third biggest 
export sector to the EU.8 This export sector is also becoming more important: between 
2003 and 2007, exports to the EU in computers and electronics went from $32 billion to 
almost $40 billion.9 The U.S. is therefore dependent on the EU market for exports of 
electronics, making adoption of RoHS standards at the federal level more likely.    
Regulatory Learning 
Since RoHS is relatively new, there have yet to be any impact assessments of its 
effectiveness in the EU. It is therefore difficult for U.S. regulators to learn from the EU 
RoHS experience. However, it is likely that U.S. government officials have learned about 
RoHS through other channels. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, the 
EU was required to submit a draft measure of RoHS to the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) process. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) attends 
WTO meetings and comments on these types of proposals.  
Dolf van Wijck, sector group leader at the European Chemical Industry Council 
(Cefic) argues that RoHS will change the way electronics manufacturers recycle but that 
policy change will come from regulatory learning.10  
Political Context 
                                                            
8 “Trade Facts”. Transatlantic Business Dialogue. 
http://www.tabd.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=48  
 
9 Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
 
10 Interview with Dolf van Wijk, 1 September 2009. 
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In regards to the EDEE, industry is in agreement that there needs to be new 
federal rules. However, there is still debate over the details. 11 The National Electrical 
Manufacturers Association (NEMA), for example, has voiced support for EDEE 
according to a white paper they released shortly after the bill was introduced.12 They 
argue that a “national standard would provide a level, competitive playing field for both 
domestically manufactured and imported products and prevent a patchwork of regulatory 
requirements”. 13 As a major industry group, NEMA’s support for EDEE makes its 
adoption more likely.  
The fact that California has already passed its own RoHS law also makes it more 
likely that the U.S. federal government will enact a similar standard. According to Sachs, 
“this state provision is likely to affect manufacturing nationwide for these products, given 
the size of the California market, and may elevate RoHS into a kind of global electronics 
standard”.14 Furthermore, California itself is likely to lobby for a national law because it 
will be inefficient, given the importance of the California electronics industry, to operate 
with a patch-work of state laws instead of one U.S. law.  
At the moment, the U.S. has domestic capacity to change given the political 
landscape. With the election of Barack Obama and a Democratic controlled House and 
                                                            
 
11 Mayhew-Smith, Alex. “Comment: US Inches Towards RoHS-style Rules”. ElectronicsWeekly.com. 
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%20EDEE%20Act%20%28H.R.%202420%29.pdf  
 
14 Sachs, EPR in the European Union and the United States, p. 94. 
 
  20
Senate, passage of RoHS-like legislation is more likely than previously under a 
Republican-controlled U.S. government.15 On the other hand, the U.S. government still 
does not recognize the Precautionary Principle as the basis of U.S. law.  
4.2 The EU’s Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
Directive 
In this section, I describe the impact of WEEE at the market, state, and federal 
level. I demonstrate that at the market and state level, WEEE has already had a big 
impact. WEEE has been diffused more thoroughly at the state level than RoHS, even 
though both policies are concerned with E-Waste and were introduced together by the 
European Commission. At the federal level, there is WEEE-like legislation pending and 
the prospects for enactment seem about as good as for RoHS. 
4.2.1 WEEE’s Impact on the U.S. Marketplace 
As with RoHS, WEEE standards have been widely adopted at the market level. 
The primary factor for adoption is economic context. Companies like Microsoft and 
Apple adopted WEEE even before it went into force in the EU. Compliance with WEEE 
is compulsory under some circumstances for companies doing business with the EU. If a 
U.S. company that is established in the EU, such as Apple, wants to sell its product in the 
EU it must be WEEE compliant. The one exception to this requirement pertains to 
smaller U.S. companies that are not established in the EU and that simply sell their 
product to an EU company. They do not have to comply with WEEE. This is in contrast 
RoHS, where all products exported from the US must be RoHS-compliant.  
                                                            
15 www.barackobama.com/issues/newenergy/index.php  
  21
An even more significant factor explaining WEEE’s adoption by U.S. companies 
is that WEEE is easy to comply with as you only need to pay a fee. In contrast to RoHS, 
companies only need to pay a fee. Thus, WEEE is not nearly as invasive in business 
operations as is the case with RoHS. Also, WEEE governs a larger sector of the economy 
than RoHS, making it more likely to affect more businesses. WEEE covers two more 
categories of products than RoHS. Thus, the economic context has driven the widespread 
diffusion of WEEE standards in the U.S. marketplace. I found no evidence in the 
literature suggesting that political context or regulatory learning played a role in this 
diffusion. 
4.2.2 WEEE’s Impact on State Policy 
Currently, there are 19 states in the U.S. with E-Waste laws that are similar to the 
WEEE directive. They include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. It is important to note that these 
U.S. states began passing E-Waste laws after the WEEE directive was introduced, 
beginning with the California E-Waste law in 2003. 
Economic Context 
For California, Oregon and Virginia, computers and electronic equipment was the 
major export sector to the EU. For Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas 
and Washington, electronics are the second biggest export sector to the EU. For 
Connecticut, Hawaii and Maine electronics are the third biggest export sector to the EU. 
For Illinois, North Carolina, New Jersey and New York, electronics are the fourth biggest 
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export sector to the EU. Electronics exports to the EU from Indiana and West Virginia 
are the fifth and ninth biggest export sectors to the EU.16 It is clear that, with the 
exception of West Virginia, the EU is an important export market for each state’s 
electronics industry. Thus, with the exception of West Virginia, each state that adopted 
WEEE-like rules were dependent on the EU as an export market for products covered by 
the WEEE directive. 
Regulatory Learning 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for Congress highlights the sheer 
amount of E-Waste in the U.S., the hazardous substances in E-Waste, the cost of 
recycling electronics, and the lack of a national E-Waste recycling law as factors that led 
to states adopting E-Waste laws17. Within the California and the Minnesota laws, there is 
a specific reference to the EU, suggesting that these states learned from the EU 
experience. However, there is no evidence to suggest that regulatory learning from the 
EU prompted states to enact reform.  
Political Context 
Adoption of E-Waste laws at the state level has occurred mainly because the 
federal government has yet to pass any national legislation. Consumer Electronics 
                                                            
16 Hamilton, Daniel S. and Joseph P. Quinlan. ”The Transatlantic Economy 2009: Annual Survey of Jobs, 
Trade and Investment between the United States and Europe”. Washington, DC. Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, 2009. 
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Association (CEA) Director Parker Brugge said that "a lot of states have waited, hoping 
Congress would take it up. ... They're tired of waiting,"18 
Interest groups have also played a role in pushing for E-Waste legislation at the 
state level. The Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, for instance, advocated for reform in 
California.19 While drafting the legislations, states also held advisory committees of 
stakeholders including NGOs and industry representatives when drafting the proposal.20 
4.2.3 WEEE’s Impact on Federal Policy 
The U.S. E-Waste policy is currently governed by the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal 
Act (SWDA) which is increasingly receiving calls for reform. There are currently three 
pieces of legislation pending in Congress. H.R. 1580, the Electronic Waste Research and 
Development Act, was introduced by Representative Gordon, Democrat from Tennessee. 
The bill passed the House on April 22, 2009 and has been referred to the Senate. A 
related bill introduced in the Senate, S. 1397, the Electronic Device Recycling Research 
and Development Act, was introduced by Senator Klobuchar, Democrat from Minnesota. 
These bills encourage E-Waste recycling by providing grants for E-Waste recycling 
research.   
                                                            
18 Eric Kelderman . “Minn. takes the lead in e-cycling”. Stateline.org. 
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=233311  
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Process”. http://www.mn-ei.org/projects/images/SolidWaste/2002BlueRibbonPanelProcessReport.pdf  
 
  24
Another WEEE-like piece of legislation is H.R. 2595 which “aims to restrict 
certain exports of E-Waste and proposes an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act 
(SWDA)”.21 However, it is unlike the EU WEEE in that “there is no producer 
registration, labeling, or financing requirement.” This means that the scope is much 
narrower than the EU WEEE directive. 
Economic Context 
A major aspect of the economic context that influences the likelihood of WEEE’s 
adoption appears to be the low cost of compliance. WEEE is not as costly as RoHS for 
companies to comply with. WEEE does not intrude in the production of electronic 
equipment, but instead requires that each company exporting to the EU pay a certain fee 
for it to be recycled. The cost of paying the fee appears not to outweigh the benefit of 
continuing to sell the products in the EU market. Thus, it may have been relatively easy 
for companies to adopt WEEE in order to do business with the EU. 
As already mentioned, the U.S. is dependent on the EU for exports of electronics, 
being the third most important export sector to the EU. However, WEEE covers more 
categories of electronics than RoHS so the U.S. is more dependent on the EU for 
products covered under WEEE than for RoHS. 
                                                            
21 Nevison, Gary. Could Proposed Amendment be a US RoHS?” Electronics Design, Stratetegy, News. 
www.edn.com. June 19, 2009. 
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Regulatory Learning 
There have been two sources of information from which the U.S. could learn 
about WEEE. First, like RoHS, WEEE rules have been reviewed by the WTO TBT 
process, which gives the U.S. regulators and opportunity to scrutinize them.  
A second source of regulatory learning comes from U.S. government reports 
which have used WEEE as a benchmark for assessing U.S. E-Waste laws. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report “Strengthening the Role of the Federal 
Government in Encouraging Recycling and Reuse”22 played a major role in creating 
interest in E-Waste management at the state and federal level, according to President of 
Newark InOne, an electronic components distributer. A flurry of interest regarding E-
Waste has occurred after the passing of the WEEE directive. Regulatory learning has 
been a major driving factor behind the diffusion of WEEE-like policies at the federal 
level.  
Political Context 
As more states adopt WEEE-like laws, electronics manufacturers and NGOs are 
pressuring on the government to adopt a U.S. version of WEEE. Among industry groups 
supporting a national law are the CEA23, the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA)24 and 
the American Electronics Association (AEA0).25 It is difficult for industry to comply 
                                                            
22 Strengthening the Role of the Federal Government in Encouraging Recycling and Reuse. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-47  
 
23 Consumer Electronics Association http://www.ce.org  
 
24 Electronic Industries Alliance. http://www.eia.org/news/pressreleases/2007-06-13.351.phtml  
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with the current patchwork of E-Waste legislation. This is because it is more costly to 
comply with different state policies as opposed to a uniform U.S.-wide policy.  
Beginning in 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored talks 
under the National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSA) between the 
electronics industry, regulators, and environmental groups. The goal was to establish a 
national system for E-Waste recycling but the talks fell apart because of disagreement 
over financing the system.26 
Environmental organizations are also campaigning to create federal laws 
governing E-Waste. The Product Stewardship Institute, for instance, urged Congress to 
pass H.R. 1580.27  
Many U.S. states have already passed WEEE-like laws, putting added pressure on 
the government to pass legislation to get rid of a patchwork of laws. Further, the present 
Democratic controlled legislative and executive branch makes reform even more likely. 
In sum, given the fact that there is evidence of regulatory learning as well as 
pressure from interest groups, the likelihood seems high that that there will be national 
legislation similar to the EU’s RoHS directive in the near future. Since WEEE covers a 
broader range of the electronics sector than RoHS and, as such, this will have a bigger 
impact on U.S. industry and government by extension. 
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4.3 The EU’s Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of 
Chemicals (REACH) Regulation 
Following is a description of the effects of REACH at the U.S. market, state, and 
federal levels. Economic context, regulatory learning, and political context are considered 
for spurring chemical regulatory reform at the state and federal level and compliance with 
REACH at the market level. The study finds that changes at the market level have been 
much greater than for either RoHS or WEEE. At the state level the diffusion of REACH 
falls about halfway between RoHS and WEEE. At the federal level, prospects look good 
for an overhaul of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), while a chemical 
regulatory structure with the same scope as REACH is unlikely.  
4.3.1 REACH’s Impact on the U.S. Marketplace 
The U.S. marketplace has been greatly impacted by REACH. In contrast to RoHS 
and WEEE, REACH not only impacts the chemical industry, but many other industries 
that produce products containing chemicals. According to René van Slotan, Executive 
Director for Industrial Policy and Cefic, “REACH will affect the U.S. marketplace more 
than RoHS” because REACH affects more sectors and NGOs have used various types of 
blacklists drawn from REACH to pressure companies to change.28 
Economic Context 
The European chemical industry is the largest in the world and the supply chain is 
highly globalized.29 There has already been a big effect on global supply-chains of 
                                                            
28 Interview with René van Slotan, Executive Director for Industrial Policy and Cefic. 21 Sep. 2009 
 
29 René van Slotan 2009. 
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chemical products.30 The global chemical supply chain goes through different countries 
with varying degrees of chemicals regulation strictness and companies are prone to adopt 
the highest standard in order to standardize the supply chain. Furthermore, companies 
such as Dow and BASF have large operations in both the EU and U.S. In fact, one third 
of transatlantic chemical trade is intercompany trade.31 These factors make REACH 
much more likely to be exported to the U.S. marketplace because the major chemical 
companies have large operations on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Regulatory Learning 
REACH requires that information be passed down the supply chain in regards to 
certain risks and hazards associated with chemicals being used. In the marketplace, 
information disclosure will affect chemical producers because they “may incorporate EU 
toxicity testing and information disclosure norms into their own internal practices” 
leading to an “informational California Effect”32. There seems to be no direct evidence of 
this but the existence of data does encourage reform. 
Political Context 
Interest groups have worked hard to get the U.S. marketplace to comply with 
REACH. Inspired by REACH, the group Moms Rising, for instance, has successfully 
created change within the Wal-Mart Company. In October 2006, Wal-Mart announced its 
Preferred Chemicals Policy “to establish a clear set of preferred chemical characteristics 
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for product ingredients” which would “drive the development of more sustainable 
products for mother, child, and the environment”.33 Moms Rising specifically pushed for 
this change.34 
4.3.2 REACH’s Impact on U.S. State Policy 
There have been a few states so far that have adopted REACH-like legislation 
although they all have a narrower scope than REACH. These include California, Maine 
and Massachusetts. On September 4, 2008, California passed S.B. 509, creating the 
Toxics Information Clearinghouse in California which is similar to REACH’s database 
requirement. On September 29, 2008, California passed Chemicals of Concern Bill, 
which is REACH-like but narrower in scope.35 In comparison with “Cal RoHS”, 
California’s chemical legislation is not identical to its EU counterpart REACH. Rather, it 
is tailored more to the specific health and economic needs of California. Massachusetts is 
trying to pass a REACH-like bill called “A Healthy Massachusetts: Safer Alternatives to 
Toxic Chemicals.”36 Maine has passed the “Act to Protect Children’s Health and the 
Environment from Toxic Chemicals in Toys and Children’s Products”.37 Adoption of 
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REACH-like legislation has mixed causes. Some states’ adoption of chemical legislation 
has resulted from economic concerns and others from regulatory learning. 
Economic Context 
The state of California provides a good example of how economic context led to 
reform. A report on “Green Chemistry” was created by the California Senate 
Environmental Quality Committee and the California Assembly Committee on 
Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials in 2004. The report reflects the power of 
REACH because it outlines the four ways that REACH could hurt the California 
chemical industry. They include putting California at a disadvantage because REACH 
promotes green chemistry and the burdens for small firms who would find complying 
with REACH prohibitive for exporting the EU market. It also argues that there would be 
a significant danger to consumer and worker protection if production of dangerous 
chemicals is shifted to California.  This report led to the Green Chemistry Initiative 
which “presents 38 options to advance green chemistry in California, and in so doing 
makes ample reference to REACH.”38  
The chemical industry is important but is not nearly as dependent on the EU 
export market as the electronics sector. Only 0.044% of the California workforce is 
employed directly or indirectly by REACH exports and REACH exports only account for 
0.063% of Gross State Product (GSP).39 However, chemicals are the second biggest 
export sector to the EU after electronics and exports have grown 15% each year since 
                                                            
38 The Green Chemistry Report. 
http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/PollutionPrevention/GreenChemistryInitiative/Index.cfm  
 
39 “California and Europe: Employment, Investment, and Trade Linkages”. European American Business 
Council. http://www.eabc.org/pdf/states/California.pdf  
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2000.40 This makes a strong case that chemical reform in California is affected by the 
economic context but not to the extent where it needs to copy REACH. 
Economic concerns were the driving force for chemical regulatory change in 
Massachusetts. When arguing for the bill, it was noted that the REACH regime is much 
stricter than its U.S. counterpart (TSCA) and that 37% of Massachusetts trade is with the 
EU. The goal for the reform was that chemicals produced in Massachusetts would not 
need prior clearance before being exported to the EU. This would diminish the financial 
burden on companies. 
Of all states, Massachusetts is the most dependent on the EU market in terms of 
REACH exports. REACH exports account for not only the highest percentage of direct 
and indirect jobs as a percentage of employment (0.29%) but even the most direct and 
indirect jobs (9, 110).41 Also, it has the highest value of shipments as a percentage of 
GSP at 0.5%.42 It is by far the biggest export sector to the EU, accounting for 37% of all 
exports from Maine to the EU.43 Thus, dependence on the EU market played a major role 
in adopting REACH-like laws.  
Maine, another state that has adopted REACH-like laws, is not overly dependent 
on the EU market, making it likely that economic factors were not the only factor. Only 
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40 people are directly or indirectly employed by industry affected by REACH exports 
and only accounts for 0.12% of Gross State Product (GSP). This is in contrast to 0.44% 
of employment and 0.063% of GSP in CA and 0.286% and employment and 0.5% of 
exports in Massachusetts. Chemicals, however, are the second biggest export to the EU.44 
Regulatory Learning 
According to Scott (2009), the U.S. is susceptible to policy change because of its 
federal nature and “the disaggregated nature of power within the United States” where 
“individual states can serve as policy entrepreneurs”45. One example of this 
entrepreneurship is California. California and EU countries meet to discuss 
environmental and regulatory matters independently of the U.S. federal government.46  
Following the Green Chemistry Initiative in California, a report was released in 
December 2008 that makes ample reference to data sharing agreements. According to 
Scott, it includes a recommendation which “would go further than REACH in ensuring 
the availability of information of this kind for consumers”47. Another recommendation 
establishes an Online Toxics Clearinghouse which would enter California into data 
sharing agreements with other countries and organizations such as the EU. The final 
recommendation urges more comprehensive chemical reform.48 This led to S.B. 509, 
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creating the Toxics Information Clearinghouse in California. This is evidence that 
California learned from the data generated by REACH because S.B. 509 sets out to 
develop data sharing agreements with other countries.49 
Maine has also learned from REACH. According to Scott, Maine has looked to 
the EU REACH regulation for inspiration by using the list compiled for CVHC.50 It came 
in the form of the April 2008 Act to Protect Children’s Health and the Environment from 
Toxic Chemicals in Toys and Children’s Products. Although it only pertains to children’s 
products, it is REACH-like in that it “seeks to train a process for identifying, listing and 
prioritizing chemicals of high concern”51  
Political Context 
NGOs have capitalized on the federal nature of the U.S. in promoting their reform 
agenda52. The Lowell Center, for example, used the database created by REACH in order 
to encourage reform. It was able to interpret and disseminate the data in the database for 
the American public and regulators to understand.53 Also, ChemSec, a Gothenburg-based 
NGO, created the so-called SIN List. SIN stands for “Substitute it Now” and is “the first 
public attempt to identify specific chemicals that qualify as [Substances of Very High 
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Concern] SVHCs under REACH”54. The information in the database is not always clear 
to consumers so it is here that NGOs have played a key role in disseminating information.  
4.3.3 REACH’s Impact on U.S. Federal Policy 
At the federal level, the most recent chemical reform proposal is the Kid-Safe 
Chemicals Act, introduced in the House and Senate on May 20th, 2008. It was sponsored 
by Senator Lautenberg in the Senate and Representatives Solis, Lee, Miller and Waxman 
in the House. 
Economic Context 
Sachs (2009) argues that the U.S. will undergo chemical reform because of 
economic dependence on the EU market. He lists three economic concerns to the U.S. 
chemical industry: compliance burdens, the size of the EU market (537 billion Euros) 
which is the largest in the world, and the fact that firms will want to comply with the 
EU’s higher standards to stay competitive.55  
The U.S. government and the U.S. chemical industry have major concerns that the 
U.S. will be hurt by the REACH regulation. The chemical industry is a major pillar of the 
U.S. economy. It is a $689 billion industry accounting for 2% of GDP.56 Chemicals 
subject to REACH that are exported to the EU “amount to $13.7 billion per year, and are 
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directly and indirectly responsible for 54,000 jobs”.57 It is also estimated that chemical 
exports to the EU will become more important to the U.S. economy in the future.58  
Professors Ackerman, Stanton and Massey estimate that it will cost U.S. chemical 
producers $14 million annually. However, they argue that the cost of compliance with 
REACH is minimal and it far outweighs the costs of not exporting to the vast EU market.  
In sum, for policy-makers, there are concerns of the domestic chemical industry 
becoming uncompetitive in the world market. Because the burdens placed on industry do 
not outweigh the costs of not exporting to the EU, the economic context is a major factor 
which will likely drive U.S. chemical reform closer to that of the EU.  
Regulatory Learning 
Reform of TSCA is likely to be heavily influenced from learning from the 
REACH experience. Criticism of TSCA has picked up in recent years thanks to a variety 
of factors, but REACH seems to be the basis from which TSCA is criticized. One of the 
main criticisms of TSCA is the lack of chemical data on dangerous chemicals. Scott 
argues that the data created by REACH “is crucial in explaining the impact of 
REACH.”59 For many in the U.S. that wish for a regulatory change has forced the U.S. 
Congress to work on national legislation on issues drawn from the European experience”. 
60 Also, according to Sachs, “Information on chemical risks, disclosed in Europe, will 
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help to close longstanding data gaps in the United States and may help to build support 
for reform of U.S. law.61  
The Kid-Safe Chemical Act was introduced, according to Scott, due to a 
“heightened awareness of the limitations of TSCA, and of reform initiatives in the EU 
and elsewhere”. Senators Boxer and Lautenberg have asked for an assessment of TSCA 
from the GAO. The GAO prepared a pair of reports criticizing TSCA and repeatedly 
emphasizing the advantages of REACH.62 Senator Lautenberg’s legislative assistant, 
Cindy Bethell, said that “Europe gave us the inspiration to look hard at our own chemical 
law and ways to improve it”.63  
Along with the data created by REACH, there have been numerous economic 
impact assessments of REACH. Studies within the EU estimate that there will be savings 
“into the billions of Euros, often tens of billions of Euros, over the ten to 30 years” after 
REACH is adopted.64 U.S. regulators are sure to take note of such high savings from an 
environmental policy.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
61 Sachs p. 2. 
62 Chemical Regulation: Comparison of U.S. and Recently Enacted European Union Approaches to Protect 
against the Risks of Toxic Chemicals Aug. 17 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07825.pdf. See also: 
Chemical Regulation: Approaches in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Nov. 4, 2005 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-217R .  
 
63 Phibbs, Pat. ”Report Lists Actions Congress Could Take to Improve EPA Assessments under TSCA, ” 
29 CHEM. REG. REP. July 18, 2005. 
 
64 Ackerman, p. 8. 
 
  37
Channels of Communication 
Various organizations serve as channels of communications where learning can 
occur. Specifically, various transatlantic economic governance structures, the TABD, the 
OECD, and UN Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) 
have each played a role or will play a role in disseminating information to U.S. 
regulators.  
The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) are two institutional transgovernmental structures which promote 
cooperation between EU and U.S. regulators. Within this framework, the TABD was 
been active in promoting EU-U.S. chemical regulatory cooperation. The chemical 
industry on both sides of the Atlantic support reducing barriers to trade, including 
harmonizing chemical regulations. Despite the efforts of the chemical industry, 
“regulatory policy is a tricky sector because it deals with two politically sensitive 
subjects: the autonomy of regulatory authorities and the sovereignty of states to control 
domestic standards”.65 U.S. regulators argue that transatlantic cooperation and 
harmonization of regulation impinges on their domestic regulatory mandates. Institutional 
realities make it difficult to harmonize regulations because domestic regulators have to 
cooperate with the EU at the same time as they are accountable to the domestic demands. 
U.S. governmental agencies have a culture of regulatory autonomy and are averse to 
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working with other agencies. They also have narrower mandates than EU agencies 
because they do not focus on trade issues.  
SAICM is a UN program adopted in 2006 that works to harmonize global 
chemical management.66 It focuses on the sound management of chemicals and has as a 
goal that by 2030, chemicals will be managed so that there is less harm to human health 
and the environment.67 According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) “in the 
long run, REACH is likely to become a key element of the UN’s Strategic Approach on 
Chemicals”.68 Furthermore, Euractiv.com argues that SAICM “gives a boost to the EU's 
own draft REACH regulation”.69 The Competitive Enterprise Institute argues that 
“another reason to believe that SAICM will have a substantial regulatory role is that 
many proponents see it as the perfect vehicle for the European Union (EU) to globalize 
its REACH proposal”.70 Currently, it is difficult to anticipate the ultimate effects of 
SAICM on the U.S. as it is relatively new. However, even though SAICM is likely to 
achieve some international harmonization in chemicals policy, it is not likely to prompt 
the U.S. will align its policy with REACH.71 
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The OECD operates a chemical program within its environment department 
which has guidelines under the Good Laboratory Practices. According to Eileen Ciesla of 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the OECD has also been used by the EU as a vehicle 
to export the REACH regime. She argues that the OECD is biased in favor of EU 
countries and that the EU member states are taking advantage of this in order to export 
REACH to the world.72 On the other hand, Vogel (1997) argues that the OECD has 
helped reduce compliance burdens on companies and governments and has thus helped in 
the harmonization of policies. There is little evidence of the OECD impacting the U.S. 
regulatory framework. It has, however, helped coordination within the marketplace.73  
The potential impact of policy positions of international organizations such as the UN 
and OECD can play a role in disseminating REACH.  
The OECD has facilitated a California Effect on chemical policy from the U.S. to 
Europe in the past. In 1977 the OECD countries began negotiations to harmonize 
chemical test procedures74. The EU was more or less forced to align its regulatory 
framework to that of the U.S. in order to conform to the concept of mutual recognition 
under the OECD. It is possible that the OECD may play a similar role today in 
harmonizing U.S. and EU chemical regulations.  
                                                            
72 Ciesla, Eileen. “Will The United States Let The European Union Regulate Our Chemicals Industry 
Through The OECD?”. Competitive Enterprise Institute. April 15, 2002. 
 
73 Interview with Dr. Dolf van Wijk, Manager Environmental Sciences, EuroChlor. 2 Sep. 2009. 
 
74 Vogel, p. 80 
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Political Context 
There have been major moves towards reforming TSCA. Recently, the EPA 
administrator admitted that TSCA needed to be reformed, noting that there are “troubling 
gaps in the available data on many widely used chemicals in commerce”.75 In a recent 
speech, she highlighted the key parts of the “Obama Administration’s Essential Principles 
for Reform of Chemicals Management Legislation”.76 Notably, one of the principles 
includes reversing the burden of proof so that chemical manufacturers will be required to 
prove that the chemicals are safe. This is the key part of the REACH “no data, no 
market” concept.  
Industry is likely to play a key role in regulatory reform. The Obama 
Administration’s proposal was supported by the American Chemistry Council (ACC). In 
a recent op-ed piece in The Hill, Cal Dooley, President and CEO of the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) states that “a review and revision of existing law, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, should be made a priority this year.”77 This is a big step forward 
for an industry that until recently has been ardently opposed to reform. However, the 
Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA) is skeptical of the proposal. 
Bill Allmond, Vice President of Government Relations and ChemStewards at SOCMA 
stated that “we recognize that implementing a ‘safety standard’ is a noble concept, but are 
skeptical about how it will be accomplished considering that other federal agencies have 
                                                            
 
75 “Obama Administration backs need for overhaul of TSCA”. Chemical Watch. 30 Sep. 2009. 
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jurisdiction over determining safety”78. Sachs (2009) argues that in predicting whether 
the United States will adopt REACH-like reforms, the stance of the U.S. chemical 
industry is the major wildcard”.79  
With the information and data created by REACH, industry will look increasingly 
vulnerable as it continues to defend TSCA. Further, as major U.S. firms become 
accustomed to REACH’s requirements, industry objections to reform of TSCA become 
weaker. Companies such as Exxon, Dow and BASF, for instance, will not oppose reform 
since they have a strong foothold in the EU market and therefore want to reduce costs by 
following one single regulation (REACH). As of now, however, the chemical industry 
has remained quiet on regulatory reform. 
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is a strong supporter of Obama’s 
proposal. Other environmental groups such as ChemSec have been involved in TSCA 
regulatory reform using the SIN-List. ChemSec has even created a pamphlet for U.S 
environmental NGOs to use to fight for TSCA reform entitled “Campaigning against 
Toxics: Using REACH outside Europe”.80 The pamphlet includes a list of chemicals 
which they urge U.S. companies to stop using. The EDF used this list to “determine 
which chemicals and companies in the U.S. are likely to be affected by the development 
of the REACH candidate list and ultimately by authorization”.81 This same report urged 
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Manufacturers & Associates. 
http://www.socma.com/PressRoom/index.cfm?subSec=3&sub=71&articleID=1917 . 
79 Sachs, p. 59. 
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chemical reform in the U.S. According to Scott, “NGOs continuously exploit information 
available under REACH to raise awareness of the potential impacts of chemicals in 
consumer products”.82 Other significant NGOs urging chemical reform include the 
Center for International Environmental Law.83  
 Interest groups helped create a California Effect of chemical reform in the 1970s. 
When the U.S. introduced TSCA, it prompted European interest groups to lobby for 
reform in order to export to the U.S.84 The opposite is occurring today with TSCA reform 
in response to REACH. 
Given the new political climate, it seems that TSCA reform is likely. Also, as 
more states adopt REACH-like legislation, there will be increased pressure on the federal 
government to enact chemical reform so that there is not a patchwork of chemical 
regulations which would create burdens for the chemical industry.85 However, it is 
unlikely that TSCA will be aligned with REACH. 
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International Environmental Law.  See also: Ditz, Daryl. “The States and the World: Twin Levers for 
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5 Discussion 
Based on this research, it is evident that RoHS, WEEE, and REACH have greatly 
impacted the U.S. However, what can this tell us about the prospect of the impact of 
future EU environmental regulations on the U.S.? Given global regulatory standards are 
increasingly being made in Brussels, it is likely that the EU’s environmental policies 
will continue to impact the U.S. This will especially continue to be the case with 
environmental policies governing product standards.  
Previous studies on this topic have only considered one of these cases or focused 
on one of the factors.  This research has built on this previous literature and come to 
similar conclusions.  However, it may be useful for future research on this topic to take 
into consideration other factors which may have led to regulatory change.  Other factors 
to consider could include U.S. public opinion and regulatory influence for other 
countries such as Canada. Also, given the 40 page limit of this paper, the scope of this 
research was somewhat limited. This topic is broad and deserves to be elaborated on. In 
particular, it would be helpful to find more economic data comparing the dependency of 
the electronics industry on the EU for products covered by RoHS and WEEE. It would 
also be helpful to interview people who were involved in the adoption of WEEE-like 
laws in the different states in order to determine which factor was the most important in 
leading to reform. This would strengthen the argument and shed light on the importance 
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of each factor.  This research is not perfect but I hope that I have provided a stepping 
stone for others to elaborate further on the subject.  
 
 
  
6 Conclusions 
We return now to the original questions: To what extent have these laws had a 
tangible impact at the market, state, and federal level in the U.S.? What factors have 
contributed to this impact? Given the fact that each of these pieces of legislation is relatively 
new, to what extent can we expect each of these laws to be adopted in the U.S.? 
With regard to the first question, there is evidence that RoHS has impacted the U.S. at 
the market, state, and federal levels to varying degrees. The U.S. electronic industry has 
essentially adopted the RoHS directive. At the state level, California is the only state to pass 
a RoHS-like law. It includes the same list of hazardous substances as RoHS and has a 
provision which automatically adds hazardous substances when the EU adds a substance to 
its RoHS list. At the federal level, the U.S. has not passed RoHS-like legislation but has been 
influenced by RoHS as is evidenced by the flurry of RoHS-like bills in Congress.  
Like RoHS, the U.S. marketplace has virtually adopted the WEEE directive. At the 
state level, almost half of all U.S. states have adopted E-Waste recycling laws but it is 
unclear to what extent WEEE has influenced these decisions. At the federal level, there is no 
WEEE-like legislation but similar legislation has been proposed in Congress. 
REACH has had the most concrete impact on the U.S. of the three policies examined 
here. At the market level, the U.S. chemical industry has adopted REACH. At the state level, 
only three states (California, Massachusetts, and Maine) have enacted chemical reform but 
there is evidence that REACH led to this reform. At the federal level, TSCA has yet to be 
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reformed but REACH has led to proposals by the White House, EPA and trade groups for 
reforming TSCA. 
With regard to the second question, all three factors appear to have contributed to the 
impact that the EU policies have had but to varying degrees. The economic context 
surrounding the impact of RoHS, WEEE and REACH has impacted the market, state, and 
federal levels. There is more evidence that the economic context has shaped the market and 
state level than the federal level. At the market level, for instance, the industries affected by 
these EU policies have experienced a California Effect. For each of the three cases, the 
respective industry is sufficiently dependent on the EU market that it outweighs the financial 
cost of adopting the policy.  At the state level, there is evidence that the states which are most 
dependent on the EU market in each industry in question are the ones which have passed EU-
like policies.  At the federal level, although there is no direct evidence of legislative change, 
the economic context has played a role in bringing the debate to the floor for these three 
policies.  At both the state and federal levels, policy makers have accepted that the cost of 
adopting these EU policies does not outweigh the benefit of exporting to the EU.  
There is evidence of regulatory learning at the state and federal levels but not at the 
market level.  At the market level, however, because REACH is supported by a database, it is 
possible that individual companies will take advantage of this information when producing 
their products.  At the state level, there is evidence that California has learned from the RoHS 
directive and that California and Maine have both learned from the REACH regulation. 
There is also substantial evidence that learning has occurred at the U.S. federal level. There 
have been GAO reports arguing for a REACH-like chemical legislation, for example, as well 
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as members of Congress who were inspired by REACH when introducing chemical reform 
bills. 
The political context played a role in the diffusion of the EU policies at each level to 
varying degrees. At the market level, the political context did not play a role in the diffusion 
of WEEE and RoHS but did play a role in the diffusion of REACH. Environmental NGOs 
have been very active in getting the U.S. marketplace to follow the EU chemical policy. At 
the state level, the political context has played a crucial role. California, for instance, already 
has environmental policies and a regulatory culture close to that of the EU, making adoption 
of RoHS, WEEE, and REACH easier than for the rest of the US. At the federal level, interest 
groups lobbying for RoHS, WEEE, and REACH-like reforms have had a big impact.        
With regard to the third question, there is a good chance that each of these policies 
will lead to U.S. state and federal government reform.  All three policies have the necessary 
prerequisites for reform: a favorable economic and political context as well as the learning 
component.  However, there are different degrees of probability. WEEE, for instance, has a 
higher probability of leading to a federal WEEE legislation than RoHS because of the 
number of U.S. states who have adopted WEEE-type laws.  Interest groups are more keen to 
push for a national E-Waste recycling law than a RoHS-type law.  Also, REACH is a much 
bigger regulatory regime than WEEE or RoHS.  It is all encompassing by targeting the entire 
chemical industry.  Because of REACH’s impact on U.S. business, there is bound to be some 
type of chemical reform of TSCA in the near future. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. will 
ever adopt chemical legislation at the same scope and scale as REACH.1 
 
                                                            
1 Interview with René van Slotan. Executive Director for Industrial Policy and Cefic. 21 Sep. 2009 
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